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CONVERGENCE OF EU AND US 




Two dynamics led to a convergence in the European Union (EU) and the 
United States (US) industrial policy views: institutional EU construction 
on the one hand, and a common threat from Asia’s economic ascent on the 
other hand. This convergence is not however a sign that the EU and the 
US have reached equal economic performances. But the similarities of the 
way they perceive industrial policy shed light on their shared perception 
of future economic challenges. 
The EU members have no common industrial policy similar to their sha-
red trade policy for instance. That said, the EU remains the source, not 
only of many industrial projects that ultimately build industrial policy, 
but also of many of the rules that shape individual EU members’ indus-
trial policy. The bulk of rules and communications from EU institutions 
contribute to a specific view as regards industrial policy. I will discuss this 
view here, putting aside the respective industrial policies of individual EU 
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members. Though this policy does exist, it is largely restricted to respect of 
EU competition and rules regarding public funding.1
The EU and the US economies account together for about half the entire 
world GDP and nearly half of manufacturing production.2 They are also 
involved in establishing most international economic rules as principle 
members of the foremost International Economic Organizations. Their 
industrial policies are undoubtedly decisive in relation to what other 
countries will do whether they decide to do the same or to do the oppo-
site. But before influencing the others, the EU and the US influence each 
other and their respective industrial policies are a result of this structure 
of mutual influence. Of course, these influences are far from symetrical 
and most often US industrial policy is a challenge to EU policy.3 While the 
EU has long been a follower of the US, and to a certain extent this is still 
the case, their relationship, today, is either a natural partnership or an 
acute competition. Their economic proximity makes them very cautious 
and thoughtful towards what the other is doing, whether to follow it or to 
counteract it. But the relationship between the EU and the US is evolving, 
while their economic power is being challenged by emerging economies 
particularly China. Eyes have shifted towards Asia. EU and US industrial 
policy is less a response to each other but rather a means for dealing with 
the main challenges of economic globalization. 
Both EU and US representatives claim they have no industrial policy, but 
both are dramatically and increasingly concerned by the state of their 
industry – leading to numerous policies affecting firms and industries. 
Broadly speaking, Industrial Policy is the “the set of government actions 
affecting companies in different productive sectors in a country (inclu-
ding service companies) and, more specifically, affecting their ability 
1 For example an EU member has to declare to the European Commisssion a three-year 
grant above 150,000 euros attributed to an individual firm. 
2 Over 1996-2006, this share has been quite constant for the US while it has decli-
ned for the EU-15 at a rate of 1.4% per year on average. Source: World Development 
Indicators, 2009; OFCE (2010). 
3 By European industrial Policy, I mean the industrial policy designed at the European 
level by an EU institution. But sometimes, in order to have an idea of what is going 
on in Europe regarding an indicator, it gives information presenting data from main 
European members. 
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to compete both domestically and abroad. This broad interpretation of 
industrial policy would therefore include microeconomic policies (anti-
trust, innovation and internationalization), the provision of broad infras-
tructures (transport, communications, education, science and research) 
and sector-based aid to companies.” This definition from the European 
Economic Advisers Group (2008) is often thought to be too broad to allow 
a clear understanding of what an industrial policy is. Most of the time, 
industrial policy is an amorphous concept at best. This makes compari-
sons between countries particularly awkward and implies that views 
about the nature of industrial policy are potentially different depending 
on countries. 
According to a definition given by the US International Trade Commission 
(USITC), industrial policy involves “coordinated government action 
aimed at directing production resources to domestic producers in certain 
industries to help them become more competitive”. However, the Lisbon 
Agenda of the EU states that “The main role of industrial policy at EU 
level is to proactively provide the right framework conditions for enter-
prise development and innovation in order to make the EU an attrac-
tive place for industrial investment and job creation.” While the USITC 
definition gives a clear focus to sector-specific policies; the EU – expressed 
by the Commission or the European Council – understands the concept as 
horizontal policies.4
A study of main EU and US reports that underpin the call for an industrial 
policy shows a convergence of views focused on competitiveness. That is 
the master word that governs the definition of any industrial policies. 
This concept is now so common and overused that nobody questions its 
meaning and its evaluation. The focus on competition between emerging 
economies as well as on tradable production may hide the true vocation 
of an industrial policy. Of course the financial and economic crisis expe-
rienced by the EU and the US since 2007 has highly undermined their bud-
get ability and has threatened further government interventions in pri-
vate markets. At the same time it has enhanced the demand for industrial 
4 Industrial policies are often classified into horizontal or vertical policies. Historically, 
vertical policies were first implemented and horizontal policies are now the poli-
cies at work. But often the distinction is not so easy as policies may combine both 
characteristics. 
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policy from economic players and emphasizes the threat on manufactu-
ring industries. The crisis of 2007 and the following years is doomed to 
feed a specific moment in industrial policy-making. It calls for a debate on 
the goals of industrial policy. 
To understand this convergence, the first Section intends to illustrate the 
background creating common challenges affecting EU and US manufactu-
ring industries. While the second section explains what competitiveness 
stands for, the last section concludes on how much further thoughts is 
needed about the true vocation of any industrial politicy in order to miti-
gate the sole focus on competitiveness. 
2. AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR A 
THREATENED MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
2.1. To what degree is the Manufacturing sector 
in decline? 
The European Union and the US are still the main actors in world manu-
facturing production: the EU-19 achieves 26% and the US 21% of total pro-
duction (Table 2).5 As regards world exports, the EU is the biggest contri-
butor given its high level of intra-European trade. Its trade with the US 
is first if the EU is taken as a single area.6 This also makes both the EU 
and the US the main sources of manufacturing exports. But such a long-
lasting supremacy has been relentlessly challenged since the beginning 
of the 1990s. The main sign of the disappearance of this supremacy is the 
decline in manufacturing employment. 
5 While Germany is still the main EU contributor, the enlargement of the EU has led 
to an increase in the EU share of world manufacturing production and export. 
6 The US is the first partner of the EU-27 with 242.4 billion euros of exports and an 
import total of 169.3 billion euros. The second partners are China and Russia and for 
imports, China is first and the US is second (according to figures for 2010). 
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Tableau 1. Manufacturing Employmenta 1991-2007 (unless noted)
USA EU-15b France Germany
Manufacturing Share 2007 10% 15% 13% 19%
Av. Annual Change -1.8% -2.4% -2.6% -3.3%
All Economy Jobs Change (million) 28 20 2.8 1.1
Manuf. Jobs Change (million) -3.8 -7.5 -1.04 -3.05
Change in terms of 1991 jobs -17% -22% -23% -29%
1.3 Of which:
- Med-high tech. jobs -7.1% -7% -7.8% -13.7%
- Low tech. jobs -8.6% -11.4% -10.1% -9.8%
Source: OECD STAN2009, calculations from the author. 
a: Manufacturing includes industries defined at ISIC 2-digit 15 to 37. 
b: EU-15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom 
All of the old industrialized countries have experienced a loss in manufac-
turing jobs while total jobs increased during the last 16 years (see Table 1). 
The US lost nearly 4 million jobs – 17% of manufacturing employment in 
1990. The Euro zone lost even more than the USA: nearly 6 million of jobs 
have disappeared – 20% of manufacturing employment in 1991. A look 
at the figures for France and Germany suggests that the more a country 
is specialized in manufacturing, the more the rate of job disappearance 
it had to face. Both the share of manufacturing employment over total 
employment and the average rate of decline from 1990 to 2007 are lower in 
the US than in the EU. This could mean that the US is on the way to rea-
ching a plateau not yet reached by EU countries. The rate of decline may 
slow down until a country’s manufacturing share reaches an incompres-
sible level whether it is close to zero or higher. 
The jobs lost were mostly located in low-technology industry, except for 
Germany where medium-high technology jobs loss is a little higher than 
the loss in low-technology jobs. Outside of the US, jobs loss in high-techno-
logy is the lowest compared to other industries. Of course the rate of change 
depends on the pattern of specialization at the beginning of the period of 
observation and its past evolution. If a country experienced a high rate of 
decrease before 1990, its jobs decrease may slow down subsequently. But 
all in all, the main conclusion from these figures is a compelling decline 
in manufacturing jobs. At the same time, the manufacturing industry is 
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still the location of the main driving forces for economic growth as shown 
by Table 2. Around 90% of total exports are from manufacturing industry 
and most of a country’s R&D is also spent by manufacturing industries – 
between 70 and 90% depending on the country. 
Tableau 2. Manufacturing Industries in World and Total Economy 
USA EU-15 FR GER JAP
1999 2007 1999 2007 1999 2007 1999 2007 1999 2007
World Production Share 21.9 21.4 28.4 26.1 4.1 3.4 8.3 6.2 17.4 9.6
World Export Sharea 13.7 9.8 41.5 44.6 5.4 4.8 10.1 11.5 8.8 6.4
Manuf. R&D Shareb 64 70 82 82 86 86 91 90 94 90
Manuf. Export Sharec 91 89 93 91 94 94 95 91 96 94
Source: OECD STAN2009, calculations from the author. 
a: 2000 and 2007; EU-19 
b: on Total R&D in 1999 and 2006; 2002 and 2005 for EU-14 
c: on Total country Export 
This makes manufacturing industry much more crucial for growth than 
what revealed its share over the economy’s total value added. This is partly 
why the ongoing decline in employment and world shares is so worrying.7 
The decline in employment is reasonably seen as a natural and logical 
evolution of old industrialized economies submitted to structural change 
and a mark of their development. But it is also considered as a threat 
over these economies’ future ability to grow. The international economic 
context pushes forward one of the two different perceptions at the fore-
front of the minds of international leaders. The dominant one influences 
then the design of industrial policy. 
Today, many leaders and experts are asking for re-industrialization. From 
journalists8 to experts (Rodrik, 2010; Aghion et al., 2011) and political 
7 There are certainly other reasons linked to the powerful status of manufactu-
ring as the only location of production of concrete commodities and materials. 
Manufacturing production is deeply associated with the past growth of old-indus-
trialized countries. 
8 The Economist 2011; Jon Gertner, “Does America need Manufacturing, New York 
Times August 24,2011. 
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leaders9, all proclaim their fear of the disappearance of manufacturing 
production. Three arguments are in favor of this new focus on manufac-
turing. First, manufacturing industry is one of the main locations where 
jobs exist. Second, manufacturing exports are one of the keys to escaping 
the unbalanced external payments burden. The high level of public debt 
and the difficulties of borrowing on the one hand and the trend towards 
increasing prices of imported raw materials on the other hand, empha-
size the need to export: the old industrialized countries have to boost 
their exports to be able to pay for their imports without borrowing. While 
nearly 80% of exports are composed of manufacturing products, the need 
to support industry seems to many observers to be increasingly inevi-
table. Third, the fact that most R&D investments stem from manufactu-
ring industries makes the loss of these industries a big concern in terms 
of technological leadership. This fear is now shared by both the US and by 
EU members. 
2.2. Convergence of views due to parallel concerns 
2.2.1. How their views finally match 
In the US, the laissez-faire doctrine and the reluctance to allow govern-
ment to step into private business is prevailing. In the European 
Community, the common market goal and the need to forbid all rules that 
could create unfair advantages in favor of a member’s firm to the disad-
vantage of another member’s firm has become the backbone of European 
economic policies. The goal of the common market has led to a strict ban-
ning of any vertical industrial policy. Because of the need for the crea-
tion of uniform conditions of doing business in Europe, the EU commis-
sion has focused much more of its energy on supervising any kind of lack 
of competition than on creating tools for industrial policy-making. As sta-
ted by Buch-Hansen and Wigger (2010), during the past fifty years “a neo-
liberal competition only vision came to dominate, giving rise to a more 
market-based competition regime,” in which public actors were excluded. 
“A public – private alliance of transnational actors, consisting of the 
European Commissions DG Competition and transnational business elite 
9 Both Gordon Brown, when British Prime Minister, and Nicolas Sarkozy, French 
President, asked for re-industrialization. 
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networks, were the driving forces behind the neoliberalisation of compe-
tition policy.” 
The EU and US positions lead to a common consequence: industrial policy 
must be a policy for exceptional circumstances only. Both the EU and the 
US are claiming they have no industrial policy. Ketels (2007) reminds us 
that US officials frequently deny having any industrial policy because of 
their belief in competition and free markets. Industrial Policy officially 
exists nowhere. But in reality, measures that are a matter of industrial 
policy are everywhere. These measures are mainly of a horizontal-type 
while vertical policies are in principle implemented in exceptional cir-
cumstances only. 
The US and EU positions have converged because each of them has come 
closer to the position of the other. First, EU views have converged towards 
US views. This convergence was the result of the European institutio-
nal process, which deepened economic integration and put the economic 
policy of European members under the surveillance of the competition 
policy regulatory authority. Second and more recently, US consciousness 
of the need to do something in order to maintain the US international 
economic rank leads to a more friendly environment regarding industrial 
policy.10 
But today, the US and the EU face the same threat and the same challenge 
from the low-wage economies. Even if the extent of the threat is different, 
both are facing a rather new competition, at least in its intensity that both 
creates their concerns about technological achievements, and shapes their 
industrial policy. The share of import coming from China has impressively 
increased since the end of the 1990s. And this occurred regardless of the 
type of industries, as shown by Table 3. 
In the space of 10 years, the share of import of high technology products 
has been multiplied by 5 for the US and Germany; and by 4 (or nearly 4) for 
10 This view was recently expressed by the President B. Obama in a State of the Union 
Address in 2011: “We need to out-innovate, out-educate, and out-build the rest of the 
world. We have to make America the best place on Earth to do business.” 
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France, Japan and the EU-15.11  Chinese competition is no longer only chal-
lenging the low-tech industries. Of course, inside groups of industries ran-
ked by their R&D investment level, firms are largely heterogeneous and 
deal with foreign and Chinese competition differently. There are losers 
and winners (see Bernard et al., 2004). But these overall figures show how 
pervasive the Chinese competition is.
At the same time, R&D expenditure has grown impressively in China, at 
an annual average rate in two-figures for 2000-2007 – from 17% to 22% 
depending on the statistics’ sources. China has set a target of raising its 
R&D intensity to 2% by 2010 and to 2.5% or above by 2020. 
Tableau 3. Share of Chinese Imports in 2007 and average annual growth 
rate (AGR) since 1997 in percentage 
Industries USA EU-15 FR GER JAP
share AGR share AGR share AGR share AGR share AGR
High-technology 25 17 17 16 10 13 15 15 25 13
Medium-high 
technology
11 13 10 13 4 15 5 12 28 10
Medium-low 
technology
12 10 10 10 3 9 5 7 16 7
Low technology 27 7 22 9 11 9 13 9 42 5
Source: BACI, CEPII, calculations from the author. 
2.2.2. The fear of losing technological leadership 
This evolution stirred the same questions in the EU and US. How main-
taining technological level and progress? How facing low-wage economies 
competition and their technological catching-up? How stopping the decline 
in manufacturing jobs? These questions have led to many reports inten-
ding to give solution to enhance competitiveness and boost innovation. 
This evolution has stirred the same questions in the EU and the US. How to 
maintain technological levels and progress? How to face competition from 
11 For the EU-15, the share is a percentage of the total import coming from non-Euro-
pean (non EU15) countries. 
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low-wage economies and their increasing ability to close the gap in tech-
nological advances? How to stop the decline in manufacturing jobs? These 
questions have led to many reports intending to offer solutions to enhance 
competitiveness and boost innovation. A recent evolution towards a decrea-
sing of the taboo regarding industrial policy is noteworthy on both sides of 
the Atlantic since the middle of the 2000s, at least in the views expressed 
by those in charge of industry. Regarding European communications, 
the change is striking in terms of words. The title of Communication 474 
(European Commission, 2005) –“Implementing the community Lisbon pro-
gramme: A policy framework to strengthen EU manufacturing towards 
a more integrated approach for industrial policy”– is in itself a break in 
tone: an integrated Industrial Policy is not a taboo anymore. It is too early 
to conclude if it will really change the EU practice. But subsequent com-
munications support the idea of an integrated industrial policy as does 
Communication 614 (European Commission, 2010) and a more recent one, 
which associates industrial policy with the reinforcement of competitive-
ness (European Commission, 2011). 
Zourek (2007), a former European Commission directorate for Enterprise 
and Industry, advocates the change towards “a new industrial policy for 
Europe”. Yet these communications, despite their titles, do not innovate a 
lot. They still focus on the provision of a global environment that is the 
best to allow firms to grow. The view doesn’t clearly depart from a gene-
ral framework giving supremacy to market self-regulation. What is new 
is nevertheless the conditionality to which the integration process is sub-
jected. All regulations have now to be scrutinized regarding their impact 
on EU competitiveness. One of the commitments of the Commission is to 
carry out a complete assessment of the impact on competitiveness of any 
regulations set up in EU markets. EU integration is, now conditional on 
competitiveness. That means that some previous regulations were not 
always in favor of EU competitiveness. The goal of perfect competition is 
acknowledged not to be always the best way to achieve a higher competi-
tiveness relative to the rest of the world. It also means that some objec-
tives like achieving the Single Market or environmental objectives no lon-
ger have priority over competitiveness. This concept of competitiveness is 
never clearly defined. 
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Signs of this change are also visible in the views expressed in the United 
States. A few years after the burst of the technology bubble, the Council of 
Science Academies released a report which made a great stir across a wide 
public audience from experts to employees12 . This sensational 2005 report 
was even used in the US President’s 2006 State of the Union address; and 
it laid the groundwork for President Bush’s American Competitiveness 
Initiative (ACI).13 Six years later, the reference to education and R&D 
investment is still a large part of the State of the Union address as shown 
by the address given by Obama: “The first step in winning the future is 
encouraging American innovation.” 
Both the EU and the US expressed awareness that policies have to be 
implemented in order to support innovation and sustain competitiveness. 
The latter word is the key word underpinning the demand for an indus-
trial policy. 
3. COMPETITIVENESS: THE KEY WORD 
Even if Krugman asserted clearly (and still repeats) that competitiveness 
is a misleading concept for a country, the number of reports on both sides 
of the Atlantic, aiming at enhancing each country’s competitiveness is tre-
mendous.14 During the last 10 years, many reports from the US Congress, 
12 The Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century, National 
Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, 
Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter 
Economic Future, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, October 12, 2005. 
13 “The American Competitiveness Initiative should facilitate innovation and provide our 
nations children a firm grounding in math and science”. To achieve these goals, the 
President called for the doubling over the next 10 years of the amount of federal fun-
ding for basic research, particularly in the National Science Foundation, the Office 
of Science in the Department of Energy, and in the core programs of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, Department of Commerce. In addition, the 
Initiative was to increase the number of math and science teachers and make the 
research and experiment tax credit permanent. 
14 See Krugman (1994) who qualified competitiveness as “a dangerous obsession”. His 
views have also been expressed more recently in a comment on Barack Obama’s State 
of the Union address: “Competitiveness” posted on January 22, 2011 in Krugman’s 
New York Times’ blog. 
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the European Commission as well as numerous political declarations of 
intent, deal with competitiveness and how to achieve or maintain a high 
level of productivity growth and innovation. In Europe, this initially dealt 
with the question of catching up. But both the EU and the US are concer-
ned with their level of technology and their level of competitiveness.15
Whether in the EU or in the US, a milestone has occurred triggering the 
return of the “obsession” of competitiveness: in the EU with the launch of 
the Lisbon Agenda in 2000, in the US with the release of the report from 
the Council of Science Academies in 2005 known by its abbreviated title: 
“The gathering storm”. 
The Lisbon Agenda was launched by the Lisbon European Council in 
2000. It consisted of a 10 years set of strategies intended to make Europe, 
by 2010, the most competitive and “the most dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world by bringing combined public and private invest-
ment levels in R&D to 3% of GDP.” The Lisbon Agenda was motivated by 
the need to catch up with US productivity and performance in innovation. 
It opened a new era in the way industrial policy is perceived and used in 
Europe. Though the Lisbon Agenda did not talk about industrial policy, 
its focus on competitiveness opened the way to the idea that governments 
could do something to boost competitiveness. 
The failure of the Lisbon Agenda was quickly assessed by the Kok report 
(Kok, 2004) in which the lack of political will was identified as the main 
obstacle. Before the financial crisis occurred, the rate of employment was 
still at 66% (while the Lisbon objective was 70%); only 1.9% of GDP was being 
spent on R&D (only Finland and Sweden reached the 3% goal); and the pro-
ductivity gap between the EU and the US had not decreased.16 Lastly in 
2010, the failure of the Agenda was shrouded in the depth of the financial 
15 For recent examples, see the Report for Congress about Industrial Competitiveness 
and Technological advancement released in December 2010 (Schacht, 2010) and the 
Competitiveness report, 2010 from the EC released in October 2010. 
16 In fact, the Lisbon Agenda ran up against serious obstacles during the 10 years 
period: the bursting of the ICT bubble; the recession in the aftermath of September 
11th; and the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 (the Lisbon Agenda being based 
on EU-15). The enlargement raised institutional questions that took precedence in 
European debate over the aims of the Lisbon agenda. 
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and economic crises. A new ten-years agenda, “2020 Europe strategy”, 
emerged as the next episode of the relentless pursuit of competitiveness. 
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the expression of concerns happe-
ned later but definitely triggered a new environment in favor of an indus-
trial policy. 
“The gathering storm” , a 500-pages report, released in October 2005, led 
to a new mainstream consensus in US innovation policy. A strong debate 
appeared in 2003 about the question of jobs going overseas, along with 
increasing concerns among Science academies about the ability of the US 
to “maintain its leadership in science and engineering to compete success-
fully, prosper, and be secure in the 21st century”. The National Research 
Council was then requested to conduct a formal study on the issue, in 
order to assist in congressional deliberations.17 The two main questions 
asked were to define the top 10 actions, in order of priority, that “fede-
ral policymakers could take to enhance the science and technology enter-
prise so that the United States can successfully compete, prosper, and be 
secure in the global community of the 21st century”. The report proposed 
more federal funding for basic research in the physical sciences, more fun-
ding for science and engineering education, and tax credits for corporate 
research and development. 
In these reports, competitiveness is taken as a generally recognized 
concept and as a consensual objective. It is indeed consensually admit-
ted that increasing a country’s competitiveness is good for growth and for 
jobs. But this is not as straightforward as it may be assumed. 
3.1. What is competitiveness? 
Competitiveness is a relative concept: it means to be better, i.e. sell more or 
produce at lower cost, than your rival. If your rival does not do this as well 
17 The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 
1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s 
purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. The Council 
has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences 
and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, 
the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. 
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as you, your competitiveness increases. If competition between a US firm 
and a Chinese competitor is affected by political changes in China – such 
as a popular uprising creating a “Berlin moment” in China – the US firm 
could see its competitiveness increasing. Closer to now, if Chinese compa-
nies had to deal with a rise in inflation relative to inflation elsewhere, 
their competitiveness would go down. 
Strictly speaking the competitiveness of an agent relative to another agent 
corresponds to the ratio of the agent’s unit labor cost (labor cost divided by 
labor productivity) over other agent’s unit labor cost, expressed in a same 
currency. This definition works as well for a single agent as for a collec-
tive agent like a country or an industry. This indicator is more accurate 
when the unit labor cost refers to the production of a single homogenous 
product: it allows the comparison of the labor cost of one unit of this pro-
duct by one agent – country or firm – to another agent. Both unit labor 
costs have to be expressed in the same currency, which explains why the 
level of exchange rate does matter in competitiveness issues. Except by the 
continuous devaluation of its currency – without increasing inflation – 
the only way a country can on a long-term basis enhance its competitive-
ness is to increase its productivity or cut its labor cost. 
This precise definition of competitiveness allows us to understand that 
the competitiveness of a company does differ from the competitiveness of 
a country. The competitiveness of a company is in no way a good or a bad 
thing for the welfare of a country. It all depends. To understand this, let’s 
reflect on whether an industrial policy should encourage firms to relocate 
their unskilled production overseas. Workers and governments are incli-
ned to say no. However, this would definitely enhance the firm’s compe-
titiveness. Is this good or bad for the whole economy? While it is likely 
to be good for the firm, it is less easy to draw a conclusion regarding the 
country’s economy in the short term or the longer term. 
So what represents the competitiveness of a country? Indicators for a 
country lie parallel to the aggregate of company indicators by using the 
share of each industry/firm and an average unit labor for each industry/
firm. Insofar as the country’s specialization pattern – shares of each 
industry in production – is different, making a comparison between dif-
ferent countries’ aggregate indicators doesn’t make much sense. It might 
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at least allow us to compare unit labor cost among countries with similar 
patterns of specialization – comparing France and Germany, for example, 
but not the United States and China. 
To progress, the concept must be replaced by a different concept: the “non-
price competitiveness”. Competition is then not viewed as a battle between 
firms producing an homogeneous product but between firms satisfying a 
common consumer need. Regarding differentiated goods, firms compete 
to satisfy a more or less specific demand from consumers. In a market-eco-
nomy, the price is always an argument in the function of demand, but it 
becomes less and less important when differentiation is also an argument. 
In an industry producing differentiated products (say cars), the compe-
titiveness of this industry depends on its average labor cost and its ave-
rage labor productivity relative to foreign industry’s same indicators. But 
what is the accuracy of this indicator of competitiveness? Does it explain 
directly and entirely the amount of the industry world market shares? 
The answer is no. An industry world market share will depend on its abi-
lity to differentiate its product to fit the consumer need. This is all the 
more so when the industry is producing differentiated goods in a mar-
ket with excess capacity. This ability to differentiate and to fit current 
and future consumer need will build international market shares. Then 
competitiveness – non-price competitiveness – could be grasped by market 
shares. But this less debatable way of assessing competitiveness gives no 
clues for policy-making. It doesn’t allow us to understand how to improve 
a country’s competitiveness because the corresponding determinants are 
not precisely known. So how can a policy be defined to improve a country’s 
competitiveness? 
3.2. How can competitiveness be improved, 
if necessary? 
As seen before, competitiveness carries several meanings. The answers are 
different according to whether the definition of the country’s competiti-
veness lies on (i) price-competitiveness or, (ii) non-price competitiveness. 
Case (i) is the clearest and the most straightforward. Suppose we define 
a country’s competitiveness in relation to an industry, toys for instance, 
how could we increase competitiveness relative to the same industry in 
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China? This goal is nearly unreachable: companies in Western countries 
will not be capable of manufacturing at less cost than Chinese companies. 
OECD (2010)’s estimates assess Chinese labor cost to be more than 20 times 
cheaper than say German labor cost. It does not make much sense to talk 
about an increase in the competitiveness of a developed country relative 
to that of low-cost countries unless the setting up of an economic policy 
intending to decrease the average wage drastically right away is envisio-
ned. Devaluating the currency could be a solution, but the worthwhile 
amount of devaluation would be bound to increase inflation, cancelling 
out the intended impact. 
What about increasing labor productivity? This depends on industry: in 
most cases there is little room for any rapid increase unless through the 
simple cutting of labor hours. A great deal of literature exists concerning 
productivity, its measurement and ways of increasing it about which I will 
not talk in detail here. Globally, these policies are mainly structural poli-
cies. They must entail a change in the specific country’s specialization, 
the say change implying a higher level of technology and/or R&D content. 
A caveat is also rarely mentioned here: the link that exists between labor 
productivity and wages. An increase in labor productivity might corres-
pond to an increase in payment to highly-qualified employees, resulting 
in an increase in labor cost. Therefore in this case, competitiveness will 
not increase, neither will jobs be created. Thus, an increase in labor pro-
ductivity may not imply an increase in competitiveness. 
Case (ii) calls for a policy that raises total factor productivity and intensifies 
innovation. New products or improved products might induce higher mar-
ket shares. Are regarded the policies intending to create a favorable envi-
ronment for firms to grow and innovate (better skills, better infrastruc-
ture, better administration, better patent protection system...). These 
long-term policies are promoted by most official reports. But nothing is 
said about their long-term achievements, the uncertainty associated with 
long-term issues as well as their inability to tackle immediate challenges. 
Nothing is said about the transition path which could have a cost in terms 
of jobs. Any policy aiming to increase non-price competitiveness is hard to 
evaluate because of a lack of precise indicators to follow. Market share is 
dependent on partners and on the growth of their demand as much as it 
is dependent on non-price competitiveness. 
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From this discussion, comes firstly the conclusion that the concept of com-
petitiveness embedded in official statements and reports is a little dif-
ferent from the strict definition given by the competitiveness indicator. 
On the contrary, the so common competitiveness concept is actually a very 
confused concept. As Krugman indicated, the concept itself is as elusive as 
a policy goal. Competitiveness is understood as an ability to conquer mar-
ket share but also more generally as an increase in a specific country’s 
terms of trade, i.e. the value of exports over the value of imports. Mostly, 
when referring to competitiveness, these reports talk about an increase 
in non-price competitiveness by changing the country’s specialization 
towards more high-quality products, and skilled jobs. Today the competiti-
veness concept in our developed economies’ view is really used as synony-
mous with upgrading in order to increase export value and terms of trade. 
But there is not a single indicator to measure non-price competitiveness. 
Moreover there is a confusion between whether the goal is to enhance the 
firm’s or the country’s competitiveness. This appears mostly to be totally 
merged into a single goal. Finally, there is no debate about the competi-
tiveness goal in itself in relation to the economic welfare of the country. 
Technological progress is meant to increase both social welfare (health, 
sanitary conditions, communications, lower prices) and the terms of 
trade. And it is assumed that an increase in the terms of trade will make 
a country better-off and enhance its ability to invest in social conditions 
including infrastructure, security and better access to medical care for 
examples. Though nothing ensures that such investment will be made, 
it could certainly not be bad for the country and people. The remaining 
question remains the issue of jobs. The goal of competitiveness always 
overlaps with this question. The issue is sustained in the US by the mas-
sive volume of Chinese imports and because of India serving as an impor-
tant relocation destination for US jobs in service industries. In the EU the 
focus is mainly on job creation. The question of relocation regards mostly 
intra-European movement – from Western to Eastern Europe. But compe-
titiveness and job creation goals do not necessarily correspond whether 
in the short or long term. And this deduction is not clearly stated in exis-
ting reports. 
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The objective of competitiveness may seem to correspond to a “try any-
thing once” concept which simply means: allowing the country to go ahead 
with regard to technological progress. Not much will have to be done here. 
All in all, all these reports or declarations of intent expressed a demand 
for industrial policy, specifically a demand for a horizontal policy aimed 
at increasing the R&D investment while also supporting innovation and 
education. The 2007 crisis and the following years are doomed to feed a 
specific moment for industrial policies. The financial and economic crises 
has emphasized the need to help manufacturing industries whose situa-
tion has worsened during the crisis. It has also emphasized the harsh com-
petition from Asian economies which didn’t suffer as much from the cri-
sis. This increased the pressure on manufacturing competitiveness while 
trade imbalances have emphasized the need to export more. All of these 
aspects establish good conditions for this obsession with competitiveness 
to be accentuated in the short-term future. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHY THIS 
OBSESSION WILL BE ACCENTUATED  
AND WHY IT SHOULD BE MITIGATED 
This obsession should keep its strength, first because competition from 
emerging economies is not going to slow down, and second because trade 
equilibrium constraints coming from the sovereign debt situation empha-
sizes the need to export. Both causes demand more support in favor of 
industry – mostly manufacturing industries – and a focus on tradable pro-
duction and its competitiveness. 
Emerging economies are poised to pursue their ability to catch-up and 
to outperform the old industrialized countries in many manufacturing 
skills. Though employment in manufacturing will inevitably drop there 
too because of gains in productivity, their share of world manufacturing 
production should keep growing until labor costs reach comparable levels 
to those in western economies. Regarding trade equilibrium constraints – 
given the level of public debt and the cost of borrowing on one side and the 
trend of increasing raw material prices on the other, the old industrialized 
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countries need to boost their export levels in order to be able to pay their 
import costs without borrowing too much. While nearly 80% of exports 
are composed of manufacturing products, the need to support industry 
appears to many observers to be increasingly inevitable, bringing some 
leaders to call for re-industrialization. But there is no way to return to the 
previous comparative advantage. Both the EU and the US, old industria-
lized countries, need to focus on what they do better, not on what they did 
better. 
So where is their comparative advantage today? It consists of quality, 
security, safety, ecology, knowledge and high technology, and all of these 
aspects included in manufacturing production made with high-wage wor-
kers (see Guillou and Nesta, 2011). There is only one sustainable way for 
western economies to keep their share of manufacturing production: by 
increasing the content of services by upgrading the value added achieved 
in their production. Industrial policy should therefore only focus on non-
price competitiveness, abandoning the goal of price-competitiveness and 
embracing honest in relation to short-term job creation. 
To justify spending public money to sustain firms, industrial policy has 
to be designed in order to increase the welfare of the whole population. 
Whether the justification for supporting industry is based on the presence 
of external factors or increasing returns to scale, the aim of industrial 
policy depends on political attitudes in relation to the future. There is no 
other way to define such political attitudes than to construct them in rela-
tion to the needs of a country’s citizens. 
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